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Unreliability
Contract discipline and contract governance under economic transition
Amszterdam
| Kiadó: | Thesis Publishers |
|---|---|
| Kiadás helye: | Amszterdam |
| Kiadás éve: | |
| Kötés típusa: | Varrott papírkötés |
| Oldalszám: | 158 oldal |
| Sorozatcím: | |
| Kötetszám: | |
| Nyelv: | Angol |
| Méret: | 23 cm x 15 cm |
| ISBN: | 90-5170-427-5 |
| Megjegyzés: | Néhány fekete-fehér ábrával illusztrálva. |
Értesítőt kérek a kiadóról
A beállítást mentettük,
naponta értesítjük a beérkező friss
kiadványokról
naponta értesítjük a beérkező friss
kiadványokról
A beállítást mentettük,
naponta értesítjük a beérkező friss
kiadványokról
naponta értesítjük a beérkező friss
kiadványokról
Előszó
Tovább
Fülszöveg
Notorious unreliability of the actors is a typical feature of a command economy. Does it change in the process of transition to a market economy? Yes, it does, tremendously. Though the symptoms of unreliability are rather well known, they have been the subject of hardly any systematic analysis. Moreover, the usual bilateral approach of contract analysis, though dealing with opportunistic actors, does not admit the possibility that unreliability can be typical. Not that the actors would be morally constrained, but their partners would not tolerate being cheated on a regular basis. In this book an extended model of contracting is presented that accounts for the more tolerant character of the actors in a command economy and the growing intolerance in an economy under transition with regard to being the victim in contracting.
Róbert Gál (1962) graduated from economics and sociology at the Budapest University of Economics in Hungary. He conducted the research reported in this book at... Tovább
Fülszöveg
Notorious unreliability of the actors is a typical feature of a command economy. Does it change in the process of transition to a market economy? Yes, it does, tremendously. Though the symptoms of unreliability are rather well known, they have been the subject of hardly any systematic analysis. Moreover, the usual bilateral approach of contract analysis, though dealing with opportunistic actors, does not admit the possibility that unreliability can be typical. Not that the actors would be morally constrained, but their partners would not tolerate being cheated on a regular basis. In this book an extended model of contracting is presented that accounts for the more tolerant character of the actors in a command economy and the growing intolerance in an economy under transition with regard to being the victim in contracting.
Róbert Gál (1962) graduated from economics and sociology at the Budapest University of Economics in Hungary. He conducted the research reported in this book at the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) in Groningen, The Netherlands. Vissza
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