Needs, Values, Truth

Fülszöveg

Needs, Values, Truth draws upon David Wiggins's most influential work in the broad area of the philosophy of value. In this collection, the author passes to and fro between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and language. The following themes are prominent:
• the elucidation of the ideas of truth, objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity
• the philosophical prospects of cognitivism in ethics
• the scope and limits of the attribution of the status of plain truth among the judgements of morals, politics and aesthetics
• the compatibility of moral cognitivism both with criticism and with a 'no-foundations' view of morals, politics and aesthetics
• the part played in the fixation of the sense of evaluative language by the antecedent possibility of agreement not only in judgements but also (the Humean addendum) in sentiments
• the philosophical ineliminability of explanations that explain a subject's thought by... Tovább

Fülszöveg

Needs, Values, Truth draws upon David Wiggins's most influential work in the broad area of the philosophy of value. In this collection, the author passes to and fro between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic and language. The following themes are prominent:
• the elucidation of the ideas of truth, objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity
• the philosophical prospects of cognitivism in ethics
• the scope and limits of the attribution of the status of plain truth among the judgements of morals, politics and aesthetics
• the compatibility of moral cognitivism both with criticism and with a 'no-foundations' view of morals, politics and aesthetics
• the part played in the fixation of the sense of evaluative language by the antecedent possibility of agreement not only in judgements but also (the Humean addendum) in sentiments
• the philosophical ineliminability of explanations that explain a subject's thought by vindicating it, and the indispensability of evaluative and subjective catégories to such vindications
• the irreplaceability and irreducibility for practical or valuational thinking of such ideas as those of need, self and metaphysical freedom.
For this third edition the author has added a new essay on incommensurability, in addition to making minor revisions to the existing text. A Postscript to the new essay draws together certain ideas that appear in Essays VI, VII, VIII and X, and develops them together under the headings of choice, metaphysical freedom and utility. The volume stands as a summation of his work in this area Vissza