The Many Faces of Realism

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THE MANY FACES OF REALISM
"The first two lecturcs place thc alternative I defend—a kind of pragmatic realism—in a historical and metaphysical context. Part of that context is provided by Husserl's remark that thc history of modem philosophy begins with Galileo— that is, modem philosophy has been hypnotized by thc idea that scicntific facts arc all thc facts there arc. Another part is provided by thc analysis of a very simple example of what I call 'contextual relativity'. Thc position I defend holds that tmth depends on conceptual scheme and it is nonetheless 'real truth'.
"In my third lecture I turn to thc Kantian antecedents of this view, explaining what I think should bc retained of thc Kantian idea of autonomy as thc ccntral theme of morality, and extracting from Kant's work a 'moral image of thc world' that connccts thc ideals of equality and intellectual liberty. In this lecture I defend the idea that moral images arc an indispcnsiblc part of our moral and cultural... Tovább

Fülszöveg

THE MANY FACES OF REALISM
"The first two lecturcs place thc alternative I defend—a kind of pragmatic realism—in a historical and metaphysical context. Part of that context is provided by Husserl's remark that thc history of modem philosophy begins with Galileo— that is, modem philosophy has been hypnotized by thc idea that scicntific facts arc all thc facts there arc. Another part is provided by thc analysis of a very simple example of what I call 'contextual relativity'. Thc position I defend holds that tmth depends on conceptual scheme and it is nonetheless 'real truth'.
"In my third lecture I turn to thc Kantian antecedents of this view, explaining what I think should bc retained of thc Kantian idea of autonomy as thc ccntral theme of morality, and extracting from Kant's work a 'moral image of thc world' that connccts thc ideals of equality and intellectual liberty. In this lecture I defend the idea that moral images arc an indispcnsiblc part of our moral and cultural heritage.
"In thc final Iccturc I defend thc idea of moral objectivity. I compare our epistemological positions in cthics, history, analysis of human charactcr, and scicncc, and I argue that in no area can we hope for a 'foundation' which is more ultimate than thc beliefs that actually, at a given time, function as foundational in thc area, the beliefs conccming which one has to say 'this is where my spade is turned'. In cthics such beliefs are represented in moral images of thc worldl' Vissza