New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure

Fülszöveg

These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of markét structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors that determine the, effective degree of competition in the markét; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordinátion under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies. Chapters are grouped in seven parts covering address models, types of competition and their impact, verticai integration and restraints, collusion and oligopoly, markét structure and planned economies, the perfectly contestable markét, and special issues in competition and markét structure. Following an introduction by Joseph E. Stiglitz, a... Tovább

Fülszöveg

These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of markét structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors that determine the, effective degree of competition in the markét; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordinátion under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies. Chapters are grouped in seven parts covering address models, types of competition and their impact, verticai integration and restraints, collusion and oligopoly, markét structure and planned economies, the perfectly contestable markét, and special issues in competition and markét structure. Following an introduction by Joseph E. Stiglitz, a chapter by G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, and R. G. Lipsey considers address models of value theory. Chapters on types of competition and their impact are by Dávid Encaoua, Paul Geroski, and Alexis Jacquemin; Richárd J. Gilbert; and Reinhard Selten. Verticai integration and its effects are considered by Olivér E. Williamson; Jerry R. Green; and G. Frank Mathewson and R. A. Winter. Issues of collusion and oligopoly are covered by C. d'Aspremont and J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, and by Steven C. Salop; and a view of markét structure and planned economies is provided through chapters by Branko Horvát and Z. Román. Following a chapter on the perfectly contestable markét by W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, and R. D. Willig, several chapters consider special issues in t continued on backflap Vissza